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BARRERA

[L.A. No. 23875.

v.

DE LA TORRE

In Bank.

[48 C.2d

Mar. 22, 1957.]

FELIX BARRERA et al., Appellants, v. ARMONDO A.
DE LA TORRE, Respondent.
[1] Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur.-The conditions of the res
ipsa loquitur doctrine are that the accident must be of a kind
which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's
negligence, that it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within defendant's exclusive control, and that it
must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution
on plaintiff's part.
[2] Automobiles- Instructions- Res Ipsa Loquitur.-Where an
automobile driven by defendant went over the curb, across a
sidewalk, through a fence and crashed against plaintiffs' house,
regardless of whether, as defendant claimed, there was a prior
collision between his car and another automobile with the
consequent wresting of his car from his control and its striking plaintiffs' house, or whether, as plaintiffs claimed, their
damages were occasioned by only one car, which was that of
defendant, it could not be said as a matter of law that defendant lost control of his automobile so as to render the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine inapplicable, but these were matters
for the jury to weigh in the light of the required conditions,
and an appropriate instruction concerning the doctrine would
have been proper.
[3] Appeal-Objections-Instructions.-Plaintiffs who did not request an instruction on res ipsa loquitur may not argue on appeal that the court erred in failing to give a specific instruction thereon.
[4] !d.-Objections- Exceptions- Instructions.-A litigant may
question the correctness of the charge to the jury though he
made no complaint at the time of its occurrence. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 647.)
[5] Automobiles- Presumptions and Inferences.-The mere fact
that an automobile crashed into a house suggests negligence on
the part of someone, though the factor of responsibility of any
particular person may remain to be determined.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 123 et seq.; Am.Jur., Negligence,
§ 295 et seq.
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Automobiles, § 399.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 8] Negligence, § 133; [2] Automobiles,
§355(5); [3] Appeal and Error, §193; [4] Appeal and Error,
§ 214; [5] Automobiles, § 193(1); [6] Negligence, § 198(2); [7]
Automobiles, § 355(1); [9] Automobiles, § 364; [10) Appeal and
Error, § 120.
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Negligence-Instructions-Presumptions and Inferences.-An
instruction that the mere fact that an accident happened does
not give rise to a legal inference that it was caused by negligence or that any party to the accident was negligent should
not be given where the undisputed eYidcncc shows that only
one dangerous instrumentality was involved and sueh instrumentality was in defendant's exclusiye control.
Automobiles-Instructions-Presumptions and Inferences.-In
an action for damages to a house which was struck by defendant's automobile, where there was evidence that two instrumentalities W(,l'e involved in the accident and it was questionable whether the conditions of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine
were satisfied, an instruction that the mere fact that an accident happened does not give rise to a legal inference that it
was caused by negligence or that any party to the accident
was negligent would p<~rmit the application of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine if the elements of that doctrine were found
to be present, and since such an instruction would be proper
when accompanied by an instruction on the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine, the same reasoning would indicate its propriety when
not so accompanied, if given in a case in which it cannot be
said as a matter of law that such doctrine was applicable and in
which no instruction with respect to the doctrine was requested.
[8] Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur.-The res ipsa loquitur doctrine concerns a type of circumstantial evidence on which
plaintiff may rely to make out a prima facie case against defendant.
[9] Automobiles-Appeal-Objections-Instructions.-In an action
for damages to a house which was struck by defendant's automobile, where there was sufficient evidence in the case from
which the jury, whether instructed or not on the matter, could
have drawn the inference that defendant was negligent if it
had chosen to do so, and where there was also sufficient evidence to support a finding that defendant was not negligent,
plaintiffs may not, in the absence of any request for instructions on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, prevail in objections
to the giving of an instruction that the mere fact that an accident happened does not give rise to a legal inference that it
was caused by negligence or that any party to the accident
was negligent, without an accompanying instruction on res
ipsa loquitur.
[10] Appeal-Objections-Adherence to Theory of Case.-In an
action for damages to a house which was struck by defendant's
automobile, plaintiffs may not for the first time on appeal
change the theory of their cause of action from one of negligence to one of trespass as ground of reversnl of an adverse
judgment, the faets not being undisputed.
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Ellsworth Meyer, Judge. Affirmed .
.Action for damages to a house which was struck by an
automobile. Judgment for defendant affirmed.
Ernest V. Shockley and Edward Raiden for Appellants.
Schell, Delamer & Loring and Fred B. Belanger for Respondent.
SPENCE, J.-Plaintiffs, husband and wife, appeal from a
judgment for defendant entered on a jury verdict in an action
brought to recover damages allegedly resulting from defendant's negligent running of his automobile against plaintiffs'
house. They contend that the trial court committed prejudicial error in the instructions to the jury, but we have concluded that this contention cannot be sustained. Furthermore, we have concluded that there is no merit in the suggestion of either plaintiffs or defendant that the question of
whether defendant was or was not negligent was a question
to be determined as a matter of law by the court rather than
as a matter of fact by the jury.
On November 7, 1953, about midnight, defendant was driving his automobile westerly on Third Street in Los Angeles.
Beyond the intersection of that street with Arizona Street
his automobile went over the curb, across the sidewalk,
through a chain-link fence, and crashed against plaintiffs'
house. Third Street runs east and west and is about 75 feet
wide . .Arizona Street runs north and south and is about 50
feet wide. There was a boulevard stop sign on Arizona Street
at the south entrance of the intersection.
Defendant was the only eyewitness to the accident. He
testified that when he was about 20 feet east of the intersection and traveling west at a speed of approximately 20
miles per hour, he saw an automobile on Arizona Street
traveling north; that it was then about 50 feet south of the
intersection, which was "back from the boulevard stop" and
to his left; that he glanced to his right, and then again to
his left, at which time he saw the other automobile about
8 to 10 feet from him, traveling at an estimated speed of 50
miles per hour; that as he passed the center of the intersection,
the other automobile struck the left rear fender of his automobile, knocking him off the driver's seat and to the floorboard; that he then "must have touched the accelerator, as
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[his] car gathered speed," and veered to the left, going
"completely out of control," jumping over the south curb
of Third Street, and striking plaintiffs' house, which was
about 100 feet west of the intersection. Defendant further
testified that after the accident, the driver of the other automobile "turned off his lights and ... sped away," with its
"front bumper ... dragging on the ground"; that the other
automobile was a 1941 Chevrolet because he went back to the
corner and found there "part of a bumper and a piece of [its]
skirt" so indicating, which articles the police later examined
and took as evidence; that he saw a "brush mark" about 15
feet long at the intersection, which was well lighted.
One of the investigating officers, as a witness for defendant,
testified that he arrived at the scene of the accident about
12 :25 a. m.; that defendant was sober; that defendant told
him that he had been struck by another automobile, when it
"failed to stop at Third Street and drove into his left rear,"
causing "him to slide to the right-hand side of [his] car,"
so that he ''ran into the building and fence before he could get
to the pedals''; and that defendant further stated that the
other automobile's" front bumper was dragging on the ground
as it left the scene."
The parties first are in dispute as to whether or not the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable here. [1] They
agree that the doctrine has these three conditions: (1) the
11ccident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur
in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it must have
been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and ( 3) it must not have
been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part
of the plaintiff. (Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal.2d 811, 823 [291
P.2d 915]; Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486, 489 [154 P.2d
687, 162 A.L.R. 1258] ; Prosser on Torts, second ed. 1955
(Hornbook Series), p. 201.) Obviously in this case conditions
(1) and (3) were met. [2] Defendant claims that condition
(2) was not met because when the other automobile struck
his automobile in the intersection, his automobile went out
of his control, jumped the curb and crashed into plaintiffs'
house. The car then being out of his control, defendant
contends that he cannot be held responsible for plaintiffs'
damages under that doctrine. (McDonald v. Cantley, 214
Cal. 40, 45 [3 P.2d 552]; Staples v. L. W. Blinn Lbr. Co.,
97 Cal.App. 387, 392 [275 P. 813].) This argument assumes
that the jury was required to find that the accident happened
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exactly as defendant testified. On the other hand, plaintiffs
claim that defendant's explanation >vas highly improbable,
being based upon au alleged collision between his and a
"phantom car" ·with the consequent wresting of his ear from
his eontrol and its striking plaintiffs' house. So far as they
are eonccrned, plaintiffs claim their damages were occasioned
bnt one ear, which was that of the defendant, and therefore
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was applicable. (Druzanich v.
Criley, 19 Cal.2d 4;39, 444 [122 P.2d 53].) But regardless
of whether there was or was not a two-ear collision in line
1vith l1efendant 's account, it could not be said as a matter
of law that defendant thereby lost control of his automobile
so as to render the doctrine inapplicable. Rather these were
all matters for the jury to weigh in the light of the required
c:onditions, and an appropriate instruction eoneerning the
dodrine would have been proper. (Sener'is v. Haas, supra,
45 Cal.2d 811, 823.)
[3] However, plaintiffs did not request an instruction on
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Under such circumstances
they may not argue on appeal that the court erred in failing
to give a specific instruction. (Lahti v. JYiclYlenamin, 204 Cal.
415, 421 [268 P. 644]; JJiills v. Los Angeles Junk Co., 3 Cal.
App.2d 546, 547-548 [40 P.2d 285]; Comstock v. JJ1orse, 107
Cal.App. 71, 75 [290 P. 108.) [4] But, of eourse, they may
question the correctness of the charge to the jury though they
made no complaint at the time of its occurrence. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 647; Cook v. Los Angeles Ry. Cm·p., 13 Cal.2d 591, 594
[91 P.2d 118].)
Plaintiffs contend that the court erred in giving the
following instruction: ''The mere fact that an accident happened, considered almw, does not give rise to a legal inference
that it was caused by negligence or that any party to this
aecident ·was mgligent." (BA,JI 1:31.) [5] Of eonrse, as a
general comment on this instruction, the single faet of a ear
erashing into a house, without more, does suggest negligence
on the part of someone although the factor of responsibility
of any particular person may still remain to be determined.
But without emphasis on this portion of the instruction,
plaintiffs elaim that the instruction preeluded the jury from
eonsidering the applieation of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine
in its possible relation to defendant. [6] It has been held that
the challenged instruction should not be given where the
undisputed evidence showed that but one dangerous instrumentality was involved in the happening of the accident
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and such instrumentality was in the exclusive control of
the defendant. In such ease where "it was conceded that the
fatal bullet was fired by defendant, ... though instructions
on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur were not requested, the
jury should not have been foreclosed from considering the
evidence provided by the happening of the accident itself in
whether defendant was negligent." (Jensen v.
44 Cal.2d 325, 329 [287 P.2d 7].)
[7] However, in this case there was evidence that two
instrumentalities were involved in the accident, and it was
questionable whether the conditions of the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine were satisfied. A somewhat similar situation was
presented in J}fiddleton v. Post Transp. Co., 106 Cal.App.2d
703 [235 P.2d 855], where an instruction substantially the
same as the one here criticized was given along with an instruction concerning the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. In holding
that no error was committed, the court said at page 705:
"The fact that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable
in an action for personal injury does not deprive a defendant
of his right to an instruction that the mere fact of injury
is no evidence of his negligence or liability . . . such instruction called the attention of the jury to the rule of law that
the mere happening of an accident, that is, separated from
everything else shown by the evidence, will not support an
inference of negligence on the part of defendant. This instruction does not conflict with the res ipsa loquitur instruction, for such instruction does not become applicable to a
case unless several factors concur in addition to the mere
happening of the accident: ... In the present case the jury
was entitled to find that certain elements of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur were not present; therefore such doctrine
became inapplicable and the jury were properly advised that
they could not draw an inference of negligence on the part
of defendant merely because an accident had happened.''
(See also Silva v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 119 Cal.App.2d
284, 287-288 [259 P.2d 743]; Bazzoli v. Nance's Sanitarimn,
Inc., 109 Cal.App.2d 232, 241 [240 P.2d 672] ; Seedborg v.
Lakewood Gardens etc. Assn., 105 Cal.App.2d 449, 455-456
[233 P.2d 943].)
It thus appears that the criticized instruction would permit the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur if
the elements of that doctrine were found to be present. Since
such an instruction would be proper when accompanied by an
instruction on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, the same reason-
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ing would likewise indicate its propriety when not so accompanied, if given in a case in which it cannot be said as a
matter of law that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was applicable
and in which no instruction with respect to that doctrine was
requested. [8] The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur concerns a
type of circumstantial evidence upon which the plaintiff may
rely to make out a prima facie case of negligence against the
defendant. [9] There was sufficient evidence in the present
case from which the jury, whether instructed or not upon the
matter, could have drawn the inference that defendant had
been negligent, if it had chosen to do so. (Rose v. Melody
Lane, 39 Cal.2d 481, 488 [247 P.2d 335] ; Fedler v. Hygelund,
106 Cal.App.2d 480, 487 [235 P.2d 247] .) Had the jury
done so, it could not be said that the evidence would not have
supported its verdict; but, on the other hand, the jury here
apparently found that defendant had not been negligent and
there is ample evidence to support that finding. We conclude
that in the absence of any request for instructions on the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, plaintiffs cannot prevail in their
objections to the instructions given under the circumstances
presented by the record. Furthermore, it appears from the
foregoing discussion that the question of whether defendant
was or was not negligent was essentially a question of fact
for the jury's determination.
[10] As a final point, plaintiffs suggest that they had a
cause of action against defendant not only upon the theory
of negligence but also upon the theory of trespass. They
admit that this latter theory of liability was not presented
either in the trial court or on appeal prior to the time
of filing their supplemental brief in this court. They recognize
the general rule that ordinarily a party may not, for the
first time on appeal, change the theory of his cause of action
(Ernst v. ScaTle, 218 Cal. 233, 240 [22 P.2d 715] ; Gray v.
Janss Inv. Co., 186 Cal. 634, 641 [200 P. 401] ), but they
suggest that this case should be an exception, relying upon
Panopt~los v. JJfaderis, 47 Cal.2d 337 [303 P.2d 738]. However, the new legal theory in the Panopulos case presented
only a question of law on undisputed facts, and it was deemed
appropriate to pass upon its merits as a further basis for
affirmance of the judgment. Here plaintiffs not only dispute
defendant's version of the facts but, in addition, they advance this new theory of trespass as ground for reversal of
the judgment for defendant. Such change of theory by an
appellant cannot be permitted. (See Anderson v. Derrick,
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220 Cal. 770, 777 [32 P.2d 1078]; Townsend v. Wingler, 114
Cal.App.2d 64, 68 [249 P.2d 613] .)
The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
Gibson, C. J., concurred in the judgment.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The majority holds that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
could not be invoked to establish defendant's negligence as a
matter of law; that the jury instruction contrary to the application of the doctrine was not error; and that plaintiffs were
not entitled to a reversal on the theory of trespass because
it was not presented in the trial court. None of these positions
is sound.
The case presents a situation squarely and typically calling
for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Not considering
defendant's purported "explanation" of the accident for the
moment, the evidence shows without dispute that defendant
while driving his car along a city street drove it off the street,
across the sidewalk, through a fence and into plaintiffs' yard
and struck their home, causing the damage of which complaint
is made; it is conceded that plaintiffs did not have, could not
have had, anything whatsoever to do with the accident since
houses, needless to say, cannot be moved about at the will of
the owner to dodge cars which leave the street in front of a
house. Defendant concedes he was the sole driver and operator of his car. In Druzanich v. Criley, 19 Cal.2d 439 [122
P.2d 53], a car being driven by defendant left the highway
and upset, injuring passengers in the car who had nothing to
do with its operation; res ipsa loquitur was held applicable.
To the same effect see Fiske v. Wilkie, 67 Cal.App.2d 440
[154 P.2d 725], and cases there cited. In Godfrey v. Brown,
220 Cal. 57 [29 P.2d 165, 93 A.L.R. 1092], the court held res
ipsa loquitur available to a guest (before the change in the
law as to the liability for injuries to guests) who was injured
when the defendant driver-host collided at an intersection with
another car driven by the other defendant (cited with approval in Ybarra v. Spanga1·d, 25 Cal.2d 486, 493 [154 P.2d
687, 162 A.L.R. 1258]). Harlow v. Standard Imp. Co., 145
Cal. 477 [78 P. 1045], held the doctrine applicable where an
operator of a steam roller in a street ran it against and
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damaged
house. Merry v. Knudsen Creamery
Oo., 94 Cal.App.2d 715 [211 P.2d 905], and cases there cited,
applied the doctrine where a car ran into the rear of a
stopped car. Price v. McDonald, 7 Cal.App.2d 77 [45 P.2d
425], involved an unattended parked car moving and colliding
with plaintiff's house. Defendant's car left the highway
and went onto the sidewalk, injuring plaintiff who was on the
sidewalk in Brandes v. Rucker-FuJler Desk Oo., 102 Cal.App.
221 [282 P. 1009], and Smith v. Hollander, 85 Cal.App. 535
[259 P. 958]. (See also Ireland v. Jfarsden, 108 Cal.App.
632 [291 P. 912]; Brown v. Davis, 84 Cal.App. 180 [257
P. 877].)
There cannot be any doubt therefore that the doctrine was
applicable in the instant case and the inference of negligence
is very strong. It should also be observed that the jury cannot
disregard the inference of negligence arising from res ipsa
loquitur and if there is no showing of lack of negligence, it
must find for the plaintiff. (Meyer v. Tobin, 214 Cal. 135
[4 P.2d 542] ; Dierman v. Providence Hospital, 31 Cal.2d
290 [188 P.2d 12] ; Burr v. Sherwin Williams Oo., 42 Cal.2d
682 [268 P.2d 1041]; Talbert v. Ostergaard, 129 Cal.App.2d
222 [276 P.2d 880]; Hardin v. S01n Jose City Lines, Inc., 41
Cal.2d 432 [260 P.2d 63]; Williams v. City of Long Beach,
42 CaL2d 716 [268 P.2d 1061); Ward v. Silveria, 102 CaL
App.2d 114 [226 P.2d 732].) Such showing must eliminate
any possibility of negligence on the part of the defendant; if
it fails to do so a verdict for defendant must be reversed.
(Dierrnan v. Providence Hospital, supra, 31 Cal.2d 290;
Druzanick v. Oriley, supra, 19 Cal.2d 439; Burr v. Sherwin
Williams Oo., supra, 42 Cal.2d 682, and cases there cited;
Talbert v. Ostergaarcl, S1tpra, 129 Cal.App.2d 222; James v.
American Bnslines, 111 Cal.App.2d 273 [244 P.2d 503] .) As
said in Dierman v. Providence Hospital, supra, 31 CaL2d 290,
295: "This is not to say that a defendant in a res ipsa loquitur
case has the burden of proving himself free from negligence .
. . . [But] [t]he general principle
as stated by this court
in 1919 (in denying a hearing in Bmlrguignon v. Peninsular
Ry. Oo., 40 Cal.App. 689, 694-695 [181 P. 669]) 'that where
the accident is of such a character that it speaks for itself,
as it did in this case, ... the defendant will not be held blameless except upon a showing either (1) of a satisfactory explanation of the accident, that is, an affirmative showing of a
definite cause for the accident, in whick cause no element of
negligence on the part of the defendant inheres, or (2) of s1wk
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care 'in all possible respects as necessarily to lead to the conthat the accident could not have happened from want
can', but must have been due to some nnpreventable cause,
the exact eanse is unknown." (Emphasis added.)
_\!]([ in James v. American
supra, 111 Cal.App.2d
276: "~Where an accident is of such a character that
l!H~ doetriJJC of res ipsa loquitur applies,
cannot
exeept upon a sbmving either (a) of a
explanation of the aeei<lent, that
an affirmative
a definite eause for the aceident in which cause
no efr;mcnt of negligence on the part of the defendant inheres,
or (b) of such care in all possible respects as necessarily to
{cad to the conclusion that the accident could not have hapfnml~ want of care, but must have been due to some
Hnpreventable cause although the exaet cause is unknown.''
(I£mphasis added.)
In the instant case defendant did not eliminate all elements
of negligence on his part in rebutting the res ipsa loquitur
inference of negligenee. 'l'he majority opinion disensses this
matter from the standpoint of >Yhether defendant showed
that he did not have exclusiYe control of his car (an clement
of the res ipsa loquitur doetrinr.) but the real issue is whether
be has rebutted the inference of negligence beeause at the tirnc
the defendant's negligence wonld have occurred, when he
was approaching and crossing the intersection, he was, without dispute, in full control of his car.'kc As I have said, defondant did not show due care in all rrspects at that time.
He said he was traveling only 20 miles per hour west on 'l'hird
Street when he approaehed the intersection with Arizona
Street and he saw an automobile travrling north on Arizona
;)() fret south of the intersection when he was 20 feet east of
the intersection; that he did not see defendant's car again
until it 1n1s 8 to 10 feet from him and he was in the intersection and it was traveling at 50 miles per hour. Obviously
through laek of attention or deliberately, he drove into the
path of a vehicle traveling 50 miles an hour when he had
ample time to stop. At that speed he must have known that
the car could not stop at the intersection, yet he proceeded
across the interseetion and into its path. He thus has not, as
a matter of law, eliminated all negligence on his part and
~"The exclusive control
gence rather than at the
Co., 33 Cal.2d [)14 [203
24 Cal.2d 453 [150 P.2d

in res ipsa loquitur is at the time of the neglitime of the injury. ( Gonlon v. Aztea Brewing
P.2d [)22]; Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
436].)
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shown the exercise of due care in every respect. It must be
remembered that we are not considering the liability as
between the other car and defendant but between defendant
and plaintiffs who had nothing whatsoever to do with the
accident. Certainly, the evidence shows some negligence on
defendant's part rather than a total absence thereof. Moreover, even if we speak of control by defendant at the time
of the collision with plaintiffs' house, the most defendant
testified to was that he "must" have put his foot on the
accelerator after the impact, that was merely his deduction
from the facts, not evidence as to them. I would hold therefore that defendant failed as a matter of law to rebut the
inference of his negligence and the judgment must be reversed,
but there is more .
.At least we have a case where defendant's negligence has
been established both by reason of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur and defendant's own testimony. In such case it
cannot be doubted that the instruction given was error and
prejudicial to plaintiffs.* It is true that plaintiffs did not
request a res ipsa loquitur instruction but the jury is entitled
to draw the inference even though not so instructed. (Rogers
v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 45 Cal.2d 414 [289 P.2d 226],
and cases cited.) The instruction given, S1tpra, :flies squarely
in the teeth of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The very essence
of that doctrine, where applicable, is that the happening of
the accident does give rise to an inference of negligence; the
instruction says it does not. It is fallacious to reason that
plaintiffs did not show the applicability of the doctrine for,
as seen, it was clearly applicable, and even though, as shown
by defendant's testimony, he lost control of his car when he
collided with plaintiffs' house, he unquestionably had control
at the legally important time when he entered and crossed
the intersection-when his negligence occurred (see authorities cited supra). It has been held that the instruction here
given is inconsistent with one on res ipsa loquitur, and ground
for granting a new trial. (Brown v. George Pepperdine
Foundation, 23 Cal.2d 256 [143 P.2d 929] ; England v. Hospital of Good Samaritan, 22 Cal..App.2d 226 [70 P.2d 692] ;
see Kahn v. Triest-Rosenberg Cap Co., 139 Cal. 340 [73 P.
164] .) Indeed, it is held that it tells the jury the doctrine does
*The instruction given reads: ''The mere fact that an accident happened, considered alone, does not give rise to legal inference that it was
caused by negligence or that any party to this accident was negligent.''
(Emphasis added.)
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not apply. (Connor v. Atchison etc. Ry. Co., 189 Cal. 1 [207
P. 378, 22 A.L.R. 1462] .) This court said in Brown v.
George Pcppcrdinc Foundation, 23 Cal.2d 256, 261 [143 P.2d
929]: "The court, at the request of appellant, instructed the
jury . . . that 'The mere fact that an accident happened,
considered alone, does not support an inference that some
party or any party to this action ·was negligent.' ... Under
appellant's theory of how the accioent occurred the instruction is not erroneous when considered with certain other instructions. It may have conf?rsal tl1e jnry, however, in view
of imJtruetion No. 30 whieh states that 'The inferenee of the
negligence which yon may· draw in this case from the fact of
the happening of the accident itself shifts the burden to the
defendants of explaining the manner in which the accident
happened. . . . ' (Italics added.) These two instructions
contain inconsistent ideas and the Jury may have been confused the1·eby." (Emphasis added.) The cases relied upon
by the majority are either distinguishable or plainly wrong
and contrary to the Pepperdine and England cases. In
111iddleton v. Post 1'ransp. Co., 106 Cal.App.2d 703 [235 P.2d
855], the court cites no authority except a Missouri case for
its holding. It does not refer to the Pepperdine and England
cases. The reasoning in that case contained in the quotation
therefrom that the instrnction is a correct statement of the
law because the jury might find that certain elements of res
ipsa loquitur were not present is of no help because they are
told that this is not a case of res ipsa loquitur-there is no
inference of negligence from the happening of the accident;
they were told flatly in one breath that there was no such
inference and in the next by the res ip::;a loquitur instruction
that there might be if certain other conditions were present
such as exelusiYe control and defendant must be better able
to explain the accident. The latter factor is not a necessary
prerequisite to res ipsa loquitur (Bttrr v. Sherwin Williams
Co., supra, 42 Cal.2d 682; Sencris v. Jiaas, 45 Cal.2cl 811 [291
P.2d 915] ), and the argument in the majority opinion that
this case is different becmlSe two cars driven independently
were involved, is not 11ertinent (see Godfrey v. Brown, supra,
220 Cal. 57). This case is more like those in which "because
of the nature of the particular accident, an inference of negligence ... may be (is) so strong that no reasonable man could
fail to accept it. ... " (Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., supra,
42 Cal.2d 682, 689.) In Silva v. Pacific Greyhmtnd Lines,
119 Cal.App.2d 284 [259 P.2d 743], two vehicles were in-
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--------yolve(l and the instruction in question was held not prejnclieial b(•eause it ·was dosely "tie(1 into the instnwtion ·which
relates to tlw ncgligmwe of the operator of another- vehielc."
HPre 11·e haye no sneh tyi11g in with the ear with whieh
tlefeiH1aut ,;ait1 he eolli<1ed; the driYPr of the otl1cr ear was 11ot
a party an<1 the iw-:trudion says there is no inference of
negligPlH'e as to a party to this al:(·i<lenL The instrnetiou in
Ba:?.ufi \". }ianec's Sanitarium, Inc., 10!1 Cal.App.2<1 232 [240
I' .2d 6/2 J, was not the sanw al' the one hen~ given. I 11
8ccd!Joru v. Luhcwood Oanlr:ns etc. Assn., JOG Cal.App.2d
i4!l [2:3:3 l'.2d !14:3], the jmy \H're in efl'cd told that the
instrndion gin•n in the instant ea:se cli(1 not prev(•ut the
i ILfen'lH'(' f-:aid to arise nncler the res ipsa loq nitnr doetrine.
'!'he 1'easo11ing of the majority that, as wlwu the instant
insirnd ion and those on res ipsa loqnitnr arc both given,
there is 110 prejudicial error, there ean he none where only
tlw in:-:tant one is given, is not tenable. 'l'hat <loes not follow
for "·here both are g·iwll the jnry is at lrast told ther-e is an
infercml' althongh they are also advised to the contrary.
Bnt -where tl]('y are told, as here, that th<'n' is no infen•nce,
the1·e is nothing left for tlw jury to do except flnd no liability.
All,\" jnt'y wonl<1 natnrally infer that the drivet· of the ear
whidl erashed iuto a man's home was negligent bnt when they
are speeifieally told, as they were here, that tlwy conld not
~o infer, there was nothing left for them to do except find
for llcfendant. Unquestionably the instruetion was erroneous
an<1 hig'hly prejndieial. The jury was instructed that there
eon1c1 be no n•eoYery nnlcsR it was proved that defendant
was negligent and that there was no inference of negligenee.
Plaintiffs ·were giwn no omJOrtunity to reeoyer inasmuch as
tlw nature of the aeeicleut 1ras sneh that they eonld not prove
negligf'nt eonclnct on the part of defendant exeept by inference.
The majorit.\- hol(1s that plaintifis eannot rely on the tllf'ory
of trespass be('anse it was not nrgerl in the trial eonrt. Even
a~:-mming tbat dl•f('lHlant loRt control of his ear because of
its eollision with the other ear, and, as a result it ran into
plaintiffs' home, yet he would be liable for trespass if his
negligenec eontributed to his loss of control (Rest., Torts,
~§ 165, lGG, 164, HiS), aJHl as we have seen, defendant was
neg] igent as a matter of law. Plaintiffs' eomplaint and proof
l'outainecl all of the elrments of an action for negligent trespass; that theory was therefon present eel in the ease although
no instructions \Yere offered thereo11. The jury was instructed
1/S
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1lmt plaintiffs eonl(l not n'\'OYPI' nnless (1ef<'1H1ant IYas Jlegli'rhose ills1rndiom; were not framed on the theory
of trespass and \Yere for that reason erroneous. 'J'he mere fact
that the theory of trespass as snd1 was not mentioned can
make no cliffercnce.
I ·would reverse the judgment.

[L. A. No. 24145.

In Bank.

Mar. 22, 1957.]

Estate of WII.;LlNOilE lVL POSSELMAN, Deceased. HAHRIE'J' PALMEll, Appellant, v. CIIARIJES P. SALKELD, as Executor, etc. et al., Respondents.
Wills-Testamentary Capacity-Evidence.-Testamentary incompetency on a given day may be proved by evidence of incompetency at times prior to and after the day in question.
[2] !d.-Testamentary Capacity-Presumptions and Inferences.vVhen it is shown that testamentary incompetency exists and
that it is caused by a mental disorder of a general and continuous nature, the inference is reasonable, and there may
even be a legal presumption (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, sub d. 32),
that the incompetency continues to exist, and such an inference
is particularly strong where decedent was suffering from senile
dementia.
[3] !d.-Testamentary Capacity-Evidence.-A determination that
testatrix was of unsound mind when she executed holographic
documents offered for probate as codicils to her will was sustained by testimony of a bank official, an attorney, a doctor
and a psychiatrist from which the trial court could reasonably
conclude that during a three-year period prior to her death
the testatrix was suffering from senile dementia in an advanced stage and that she could not comprehend the extent
and character of her property or her relation to those who
would be the natural objeds of her bounty, while said documents were executed during the last two years.
[4a, 4b] !d.-Testamentary Capacity-Evidence.-A determination
that testatrix was suffering from an insane delusion as to a
legatee's identity, and that such delusion was the effective
cause of the execution of purported codicils, was sustained by
evidence that she persistently claimed that the legatee was an
old friend who had worked for testatrix' mother despite repeated explanations to the contrary.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Wills, § 10; Am.Jur., Wills, § 104.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Wills, §45(1); [2] Wills, §63; [3]
Wills,§ 71; [4] Wills,§ 75; [5] Wills,§ 69.

